During the past three decades, a significant amount of research on the structure of maturities (grace period) focused corporate debt. More recently, the role of corporate governance in determining the maturity of the debt has emerged as a central theme in the literature. The corporate governance literature has shown that self-interested controlling owners tend to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Such behavior leads the controlling owners to prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt, to avoid frequent monitoring by lenders, which creates conflict between controlling and minority shareholders over the maturity structure of debt. In this paper, we examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS), beyond the controlling owner, helps to mitigate this conflict. This result suggests that MLS curb the extraction of private benefits by the controlling owner and reduce her preference for less monitoring through the use of longer maturity debt. The findings are robust to a number of checks, including addressing endogeneity concerns and using alternative sample compositions and alternative regression frameworks. For estimating the model, STATA 15 software was used. Based on the results of major shareholders and there is a significant debt maturities. The distribution of voting power between large shareholders and debt maturity there is no correlation. There is significant relationship between the power of the ultimate owner and debt maturities. JEL classification: G30, G32, G34
Introduction
Over the last three decades, a substantial amount of research has been focused on the maturity structure of corporate debt. Building on the seminal works of Myers (1977) , Flannery (1986), and Diamond (1991) , among others, several studies provide evidence that firm characteristics (e.g., growth opportunities, asset maturity, and firm size) are important determinants of debt maturity. More recently, the role of corporate governance in determining debt maturity has emerged as a central theme in this literature. In this vein, Datta et al. (2005) show that managerial ownership affects debt maturity choice. Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) provide evidence that corporate debt maturity depends on the strength of shareholder rights. Harford and Zhao (2008) show that a strong board is associated with shorter maturity debt. Brockman et al. (2010) find that CEO compensation incentives also affect the maturity structure of corporate debt. While these papers document interesting results on how governance mechanisms affect debt maturity, their conclusions have been limited by their focus on the U.S. market, where the agency conflict is likely to be between managers and shareholders (type I agency problem) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . However, the main agency problem outside the United States is that between controlling and minority shareholders, called the type II agency problem (see, e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999) . The larger the control-ownership wedge of a controlling owner, the more incentives she has to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Previous studies, such as Claessens et al. (2002) , show that the risk of expropriating minority shareholders by controlling owners is the dominant agency problem in most countries. However, the impact of this agency problem on corporate debt maturity remains largely underexplored. Moreover, the literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Thomsen et al., 2006) documents the existence of a significant number of firms controlled through multiple large shareholders (MLS) structures outside the United States. For instance, Claessens et al. (2000) find that 32.2% of East Asian firms have at least two large shareholders (at the 10% threshold). Faccio and Lang (2002) (Faccio et al., 2001) , and so forth. However, a serious effort to link the governance role of MLS to debt maturity is absent from the literature. We fill this gap by examining the effects of MLS presence and control contestability of the largest owner on debt maturity. We argue that debt maturity choice is affected not only by the private benefits the controlling owner can capture but also by the ability of MLS to curb the extraction of these benefits. An entrenched controlling owner tends to insulate herself from external monitoring to protect her private benefits of control. Therefore, she prefers longer maturity debt to avoid monitoring by the lenders for a longer period. However, previous studies argue that MLS may have strong incentives to monitor the controlling owner and to improve corporate governance (e.g., Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001 ). Hence, their presence and power impairs the ability of the controlling owner to divert corporate resources, which reduces her tendency to choose long-term debt. In this paper, we examine the role of MLS in determining debt maturity by considering a large sample of French listed firms over the period 1998-2013. To obtain a complete picture of how large shareholders affect debt maturity, we begin by empirically examining whether, in our sample, controlling shareholders are indeed extracting private benefits of control. We also examine whether MLS and short-term debtholders curb the consumption of these benefits. For this purpose, we perform firm value regressions using a sample that includes widely held and concentrated ownership firms. We find that the presence of a controlling owner and the degree of separation of her control rights and cash flow rights are associated with lower firm valuations. This result implies that self-interested controlling owners have incentives to extract private benefits of control to the detriment of minority shareholders, which results in lower firm values. Moreover, we show that the effect of controlling owners on firm value is significantly less pronounced when MLS or short-term debtholders are present, which indicates that other large shareholders, beyond the controlling owner, and short-term debtholders play an effective monitoring role that limits the controlling owner's ability to extract private benefits of control. Furthermore, we provide evidence that short-term debtholders are able to reduce private benefits over and beyond what MLS could do themselves. To investigate the impact of MLS on debt maturity, we limit our sample to concentrated ownership firms. After controlling for standard determinants of debt maturity, we report evidence suggesting that the presence of MLS and the extent of their contestability of the power of the largest controlling owner are associated with lower debt maturity. This finding supports the view that MLS limit the controlling owner's private benefits of control and reduce her need to evade scrutiny by lenders through the choice of long maturity debt over short maturity debt. We also find that debt maturity is positively associated with the control-ownership wedge of the controlling owner, indicating that entrenched controlling owners prefer longer maturity debt to avoid frequent monitoring by the debt market. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including addressing endogeneity issues, using alternative proxies for MLS presence and voting power, and considering alternative sample compositions and regression frameworks. This study advances the literature in several ways. First, it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to examine how MLS presence and voting power determine corporate debt maturity structure. Thus, it adds a new dimension to the literature on capital structure choice in the presence of agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Second, it contributes to the corporate governance literature by shedding light on a channel through which the governance role of MLS could affect firms' financing decisions (i.e., the choice of debt maturity). This study also offers new evidence on the determinants of debt maturity by focusing on a concentrated ownership context (i.e., France). Studies investigating the determinants of debt maturity in France are rare. However, France provides a suitable laboratory for examining the role of MLS in mitigating the adverse effects of controlling owners on debt maturity. French listed firms typically have concentrated ownership structures and are controlled by large shareholders through different mechanisms, such as pyramid structures, non-voting shares, and double-voting shares. For instance, Faccio and Lang (2002) present evidence suggesting that only 14% of French listed firms in 1996 are widely held at the 20% threshold. Boubaker (2007) reports similar results using ownership structure data for the year 2000. These mechanisms allow controlling owners to hold more control rights than cash flow rights, which gives them incentives to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. In light of this, we expect that some aspects of financing decisions, such as the choice of debt maturity, are affected by the incentives of controlling owners to extract private benefits of control and to avoid monitoring by outsiders. In addition, research has shown that a large proportion of French listed firms have MLS with substantial voting rights. In this vein, Faccio and Lang (2002) find that about 33% of French listed firms have more than one large shareholder. Boubaker (2007) also documents that MLS are present in 34% of French listed firms. Similarly, Laeven and Levine (2008) show that firms with MLS represent more than 36% of their sample of French firms. The existence of those MLS is also expected to have an impact on debt maturity decisions, since they have the power to monitor the controlling owner. In terms of debt maturity, empirical research has shown that French listed firms have higher fractions of long-term debt in their capital structures compared to firms in other European countries. In this vein, Antoniou et al. (2006) find that the average ratio of long-term debt to total debt is higher in France (59%) than in Germany (53%) and the United Kingdom (46%). El Ghoul et al. (2015) and Zheng et al. (2012) also report that, on average, French firms have longer debt maturities than many other European countries, such as Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is important to identify the factors that lead French firms to use more long-term debt. This paper focuses on the role of MLS in determining the choice of debt maturity. The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the different arguments that link MLS presence and contestability of the power of the controlling owner to debt maturity. The data and definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Section 3. The empirical design and the results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the robustness tests. The last section concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The largest controlling owners in concentrated ownership firms resort to different means to hold more control rights than cash flow rights, which provides them with strong incentives to extract private benefits of control (e.g., Bebchuck et al. Severe conflicts of interest may arise in such firms due to the inherent tendency of their controlling owners to avoid being monitored. This paper focuses on the role of MLS in the presence of conflicts between the largest owner and minority shareholders over the debt maturity structure choice. The literature has suggested the maturity of corporate debt as an important mechanism to monitor corporate insiders. Shorter-term debt enables lenders to monitor borrowers through more frequent refinancing and renegotiations of contract terms (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that loans that have short fixed maturities give lenders greater flexibility to effectively monitor insiders by demanding frequent repayment. Stulz (2001) points out that short-term debt can be an extremely powerful tool for monitoring corporate insiders. Datta et al. (2005) argue that short maturity debt subjects managers to more frequent monitoring by outsiders (such as underwriters and rating agencies), which mitigates the agency costs between managers and shareholders. The authors show that more entrenched insiders prefer longer maturity debt, to insulate themselves from monitoring by the debt market. Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) assert that insiders of firms with weak shareholder rights prefer long-term debt to short-term debt, to avoid frequent external monitoring. Additionally, Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) provide evidence that shorter loan maturities mitigate asymmetric information problems that may arise in small business lending. To avoid frequent monitoring by lenders, self-interested controlling owners prefer longer maturity debt. Furthermore, more entrenched controlling owners have stronger incentives to extract private benefits of control to the detriment of minority shareholders and, therefore, have stronger affinity for autonomy. Thus, they are more inclined to choose longer maturity debt, to remain insulated from external monitoring for a longer period.1 The findings of Lin et al. (2013) support this view. Using a sample of 9,808 firms in 20 countries over the period 2001-10, the authors find evidence of a positive relation between the control-ownership wedge of the controlling owner and the proportion of long-term debt in the capital structure. However, a growing number of studies are showing that the presence of MLS can limit the diversion of corporate resources for private benefits. For instance, MLS can form coalitions with large equity stakes that improve firm governance (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) . They can also limit the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders through competition for corporate control (Bloch and Hege, 2001) . In a nutshell, MLS have the incentives and the power to monitor the largest controlling owner. A number of studies have empirically documented the governance role of MLS. For instance, Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Laeven and Levine (2008) focus on the role of MLS in corporate governance and show that it can affect corporate valuations. In a similar vein, Attig et al. (2008) argue that MLS alleviate firm agency and information problems driven by the separation of ownership and control of the largest shareholder, thereby reducing the cost of equity financing. Accordingly, the presence of MLS is likely to mitigate the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders, which reduces the incentives of the controlling owner to insulate herself from frequent monitoring by debt markets. MLS may also put pressure on the firm's controlling owner to use more shortterm debt. For instance, MLS may have positions on the firm's board of directors (Mishra, 2011). In this case, they can vote against (in favor of) increasing the firm's use of long-term (short-term) debt. MLS, other than the controlling owner, may also collude to form a large coalition to gain control and shift the board's voting outcome towards the use of less (more) long-term (short-term) debt (Bennedsen and Wolfenson, 2000) . MLS can also indirectly force the controlling owner to use more short-term debt through disciplinary trading. MLS may, for instance, decide to sell their 1 It is important to note that firms with long-term debt maturity could still be exposed to external monitoring through refinancing, by, for instance, substituting new long-term debt for old debt or raising new equity. However, issuing new long-term debt or equity capital does not necessarily improve the monitoring of insiders in these firms, for at least two reasons. First, even given such refinancing schemes, insiders are, in general, exposed to less frequent monitoring by lenders compared to insiders of firms with short-term debt maturity (Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat, 2007). Thus, even given these refinancing schemes, self-interested insiders still prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt. Second, when firms decide to issue new long-term debt or equity capital, insiders of these firms can manage earnings to enhance their appearance to capital providers (e.g., Cohen 
Sample Selection and Data Sources
The data used in this study was extracted using the new Ray 3 software and using the Excel software, initial calculations were performed and for the final analysis of the data and estimation of the panel data model, the Stata econometric software would be used.
Regression Variables
Appendix 1 presents the definitions and data sources for all the variables used in the analysis.
Debt Maturity
Following previous research (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Zheng et al., 2012), we use the ratio of long-term debt to total debt to measure debt maturity (DEBT_MATURITY). The Robustness section checks the sensitivity of our results to the use of alternative proxies for debt maturity. , we consider different MLS-related variables to proxy for the presence of MLS and the extent of their contestability of the power of the largest controlling owner. The first is a dummy variable, MLSD, that is set to one if the firm has more than one large shareholder (that is, a shareholder who owns at least 10% of the voting rights) and zero otherwise. The second variable, VRRATIO, proxies for the voting power of MLS and equals the sum of the voting rights of the second-, third-, and fourth-largest blockholders, divided by the voting rights of the largest controlling owner. This variable captures the relative weight that a coalition between the second-, third-, and fourth-largest shareholders has vis-à-vis the controlling owner ( (1) where VR1, VR2, VR3, and VR4 equal the voting rights of the first-, second-, third-, and fourthlargest shareholders, respectively. We also use the Shapley value solution for the largest controlling owner, SHAPLEY, in a voting game where all large shareholders with at least 5% of the voting rights are considered as individual players and the remaining shareholders as the The main test variable used in this study to proxy for the degree of separation of control rights and cash flow rights of the largest controlling owner is WEDGE. This variable is defined as the difference between the ultimate control and cash flow rights of the controlling owner, all divided by her ultimate control rights. To calculate this variable, we map out the complete ownership chains for each sample firm. Following Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) , we compute the ultimate cash flow rights of the controlling owner as the sum of the products of ownership stakes along the different control chains. Ultimate control rights are measured by the sum of the weakest links along each control chain.3
Corporate Governance Variables

Control Variables
Following prior studies (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Brockman et al., 2010; Datta et al., 2005 ; Zheng et al., 2012), we control for several firm characteristics that may affect the choice of the debt maturity structure. LEVERAGE_RATIO is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firms with higher degrees of leverage would face a higher liquidity risk-that is, the risk of being forced into inefficient liquidation because they are not able to refund debt-which motivates them to lengthen the maturity of their debt (Diamond, 1991) . However, firms with lower degrees of leverage are less exposed to liquidity risk, which reduces their incentive to shun short-term debt. Thus, LEVERAGE_RATIO is expected to be positively related to debt maturity. SSET_MATURITY is defined as the weighted average of the maturities of current and longterm assets. Following Zheng et al. (2012) , the maturity of current assets is current assets divided by the cost of goods sold. We proxy for the maturity of long-term assets with the ratio of gross property, plant, and equipment to depreciation and amortization. According to the maturity matching principle, firms should match the maturity of their debt to that of their assets. By doing so, they avoid situations in which debt has a shorter or longer maturity than assets. If the debt has a shorter maturity than assets, the cash on hand may not be enough to repay the debt. Alternatively, in a situation where the debt has a longer maturity than assets, cash flows 2 French law no. 89-531 (August 2, 1989) stipulates that any person, acting alone or in concert with other persons, who comes to own more than 5% of the capital of a French listed firm is compelled to inform the competent authorities and the firm within a period of 15 days. 3 To illustrate the computation of the variable WEDGE, we consider the following example of ownership structure. Suppose that a family owns 100% of firm A, which has 40% of the cash flow and voting rights of firm B and 10% of the cash flow and voting rights of another firm, C. Firm B in turn owns 30% of the cash flow and voting rights of firm C. The family is the largest controlling owner of firm C. Its ultimate cash flow rights and ultimate control rights in firm C are 22% (= 10% + 100% * 40% * 30%) and 40% (= 10% + min (100%, 40%, 30%)), respectively. The control-ownership wedge of the family is WEDGE = (40% -22%) / 40% = 45%. from assets cease while debt payments remain due (Stohs and Mauer, 1996) . Also, Myers (1977) argues that firms can lower the agency costs of debt by matching the maturities of their assets and liabilities. We therefore expect the variable ASSET_MATURITY to be positively related to the use of long-term debt. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. It is equal to the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. It is our proxy for firm growth opportunities. Myers (1977) argues that firms with more growth options in their investment opportunity sets are more likely to experience conflicts between shareholders and debtholders over the exercise of these options. Myers notes that a firm can control this problem by shortening the effective maturity of its debt. Thus, firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to use shorter-term debt. The variable MTB is, then, expected to be negatively related to debt maturity. STD_ROA is a proxy for firm credit quality. This variable is measured as the standard deviation of a firm's return on assets over the previous five years. Firms with greater volatility of return on assets may be associated with greater credit risk. The long-term debt market screens out risky firms; thus, these firms can issue only short-term debt (Johnson, 2003) . Accordingly, we expect STD_ROA to be negatively associated with debt maturity. ABNE measures the firm's abnormal earnings to proxy for firm quality (Barclay and Smith, 1995) . It is the ratio of change in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization over the period [t, t + 1] to the market value of equity in year t. High-quality firms tend to signal their type to creditors by subjecting themselves to more frequent monitoring associated with short-term debt (Flannery, 1986) . Low-quality firms, however, are reluctant to issue short-term debt to avoid external pressures from the debt markets. Therefore, the coefficient of the variable ABNE should be negative. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Large firms can more easily obtain long-term debt because of their higher credit quality (Diamond, 1991) . Smaller firms, however, are more likely to be screened out by the long-term debt market because of their higher degree of asymmetric information and higher risk of agency problems between shareholders and debtholders, which reduces their credit quality (Datta et al., 2005; Diamond, 1991) . Accordingly, SIZE is expected to be positively related to debt maturity.
Summary Statistics
The first step in statistical analysis is to determine the summarized data of the data and to calculate the descriptive indexes. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the internal relations of the variables and to show the behavior of the subjects in order to provide statistical analysis and descriptive characteristics for further analysis to be revealed. Data analysis in this section has been done by computing central indicators such as mean and median and dispersion indices such as standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of variables. 
3-3-1Reviews Stationary and Ownership Structure of Debt Maturity Model Selection Time
Furthermore in order to avoid the problem of spurious regression model to study the stationary variables analyzed. The results of static data on the level (width of origin and trend) based on Levin, Lin & Chu statistics are given in Table 2 : According to the results table above can be seen that the Mana series is being investigated, the results of high reliability. In order to determine the optimal model, three methods of joint effect, constant effect and random effect are used in panel models using the Lemer and Hausman tests. After estimating the triple effects models, the effect of constant and random effects, we calculate the Lemer F and Hausman statistics of the ownership structure indexes on the maturity of debt in Table 3 : According to the results in Table 3 , the null hypothesis is not rejected capabilities, resulting in a fixed effects estimation method is more efficient than the random effects.
3-3-2 Review the Assumptions of the Classical Model
After the model autocorrelation and variance of identity and difference to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests have. Based on the results of autocorrelation and variance Nahsmany due to the low likelihood of these tests, the null hypothesis was rejected these tests. Given that all the assumptions of zero based on a global standard classic written in such a way that there is no problem with the model. As a result, according to results presented in Table 4 , because the null hypothesis is rejected as a result of the autocorrelation and variance model is Nahsmany. This section examines the correlation and co-linearity between variables will be discussed. In the statistics, the inflationary variance (VIF) evaluates the multiplicity of synergy in leastsquares regular regression analysis. In fact, an index is introduced that indicates how much the changes associated with the estimated odds are increased for coherence. It is possible to analyze the magnitude of the VIF by multiplying the synchronicity. As an empirical rule, the magnitude of the VIF is magnitude of 5, the multiple syntax is high (note that in some cases the number 10 is also introduced as threshold). The results of the VIF index of variables are presented in Table  5 )
3-3-3 The Final Model Estimation
After solving the problem of autocorrelation and variance Nahsmany model to estimate the model we have: 
Conclusion
This paper establishes empirically the role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) in determining the maturity structure of corporate debt. Specifically, we examine the impact on debt maturity of the presence of MLS and their contestability of the power of the controlling owner. We use a large sample of French listed firms over the period 1998-2013. Our results show that (i) entrenched controlling owners tend to extract private benefits of control, which results in lower firm values; (ii) controlling owners tend to avoid frequent monitoring by lenders, by choosing a debt structure with long maturity; and (iii) the presence of MLS and short-term debtholders limits the ability of controlling owners to extract private benefits. More importantly, we provide evidence that MLS are associated with shorter debt maturity. This finding indicates that MLS play an efficient monitoring role in curbing the diversion of corporate resources by the controlling owner, which reduces her incentives to insulate herself from frequent monitoring by debt markets through short-term debt. Our findings are robust to modeling debt maturity and leverage as simultaneously determined. They are also robust to addressing endogeneity issues, to adopting a wide variety of estimation techniques and to the use of alternative sample compositions. Collectively, our results highlight the importance of MLS in determining the maturity structure of corporate debt. They also shed direct light on an important channel through which MLS could affect the financing decisions of firms.
